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ABSTRACT: The public debate around climate change is no longer about carbon dioxide and 
climate models. It is about values, culture, worldviews, and ideology. And the greater the efforts 
to present sophisticated data on climate change—without attending to the values that climate 




In May 2009, a development officer at the University of Michigan asked me to meet with a 
potential donor—a former football player and now successful businessman who had an interest 
in environmental issues and business, my interdisciplinary area of expertise. The meeting began 
at 7 a.m., and while still nursing my first cup of coffee the potential donor began the 
conversation with “I think the scientific review process is corrupt.” I asked what he thought of a 
university based on that system, and he said that he thought that the university was then corrupt, 
too. He went on to describe the science of climate change as a hoax, using all the familiar lines 
of attack—sun spots and solar flares, the unscientific and politically flawed consensus model, 
and the environmental benefits of carbon dioxide.  
As we debated each point, he turned his attack on me, asking why I hated capitalism and 
why I wanted to destroy the economy by teaching environmental issues in a business school. 
Eventually, he asked if I knew why Earth Day was on April 22. I sighed, as he explained, 
“Because it is Karl Marx’s birthday.” (I suspect he meant to say Vladimir Lenin, whose birthday 
is April 22 and is also Earth Day. This linkage has long been a source of support for some on the 
far right who believe that Earth Day is a Communist plot, even though Lenin never promoted 
environmentalism and Communism does not have a strong environmental legacy.)  
I turned to the development officer and asked, “What’s our agenda here this morning?” 
The donor interrupted to say that he wanted to buy me a ticket to the Heartland Institute’s Fourth 
Annual Conference on Climate Change, the leading climate skeptics conference. I checked my 
calendar and, citing prior commitments, politely declined. The meeting soon ended.   
I spent the morning trying to make sense of the encounter. At first, all I could see was a 
bait and switch; the donor had no interest in funding research in business and the environment 
but instead wanted to criticize the effort. I dismissed him as an irrational zealot, but the meeting 
lingered in my mind. The more I thought about it, the more I began to see that he was speaking 
from a coherent and consistent worldview, one I did not agree with but which was a coherent 
viewpoint nonetheless. Plus, he had come to evangelize me. The more I thought about it, the 
more I became eager to learn about where he was coming from, where I was coming from, and 
why our two worldviews clashed so strongly in the present social debate over climate science. 
Ironically, in his desire to challenge my research, he stimulated a new research stream, one that 
fit perfectly with my broader research agenda on social, institutional, and cultural change.  
 
Scientific vs. Social Consensus 
Today, there is no doubt that a scientific consensus exists on the issue of climate change. 
Scientists have documented that anthropogenic sources of greenhouse gases are leading to a 
buildup in the atmosphere, which leads to a general warming of the global climate and an 
alteration in the statistical distribution of localized weather patterns over long periods of time. 
This assessment is endorsed by a large body of scientific agencies—including every one of the 
national scientific agencies of the G8 + 5 countries—and by the vast majority of climatologists. 
The majority of research articles published in refereed scientific journals also support this 
scientific assessment. Both the US National Academies of Science and the American Association 
for the Advancement of Science use the word “consensus” when describing the state of climate 
science. 
And yet a social consensus on climate change does not exist. Surveys show that the 
American public’s belief in the science of climate change has mostly declined over the past five 
years, with large percentages of the population remaining skeptical of the science. Belief 
declined from 71 percent to 57 percent between April 2008 and October 2009, according to an 
 
October 2009 Pew Research Center poll; more recently, belief rose to 62 percent, according to a 
February 2012 report by the National Survey of American Public Opinion on Climate Change. 
Such a significant number of dissenters tells us that we do not have a set of socially accepted 
beliefs on climate change—beliefs that emerge, not from individual preferences, but from 
societal norms; beliefs that represent those on the political left, right, and center as well those 
whose cultural identifications are urban, rural, religious, agnostic, young, old, ethnic, or racial.   
Why is this so? Why do such large numbers of the American public reject the consensus 
of the scientific community? With upwards of two thirds of Americans not clearly understanding 
science or the scientific process and fewer able to pass even a basic scientific literacy test, 
according to a 2009 California Academy of Sciences survey, we are left to wonder: How do 
people interpret and validate the opinions of the scientific community? The answers to this 
question can be found, not from the physical sciences, but from the social science disciplines of 
psychology, sociology, anthropology, and others.  
To understand the processes by which a social consensus can emerge on climate change, 
we must understand that people’s opinions on this and other complex scientific issues are based 
on their prior ideological preferences, personal experience, and values—all of which are heavily 
influenced by their referent groups and their individual psychology. Physical scientists may set 
the parameters for understanding the technical aspects of the climate debate, but they do not have 
the final word on whether society accepts or even understands their conclusions. The 
constituency that is relevant in the social debate goes beyond scientific experts. And the 
processes by which this constituency understands and assesses the science of climate change go 
far beyond its technical merits. We must acknowledge that the debate over climate change, like 
almost all environmental issues, is a debate over culture, worldviews and ideology.  
This fact can be seen most vividly in the growing partisan divide over the issue. Political 
affiliation is one of the strongest correlates with individual uncertainty about climate change, not 
scientific knowledge.1 The percentage of conservatives and Republicans who believe that the 
effects of global warming have already begun declined from roughly 50 percent in 2001 to about 
30 percent in 2010, while the corresponding percentage for liberals and Democrats increased 
from roughly 60 percent in 2001 to about 70 percent in 20102 (see Figure 1 on page TK).  
Climate change has become enmeshed in the so-called “culture wars.” Acceptance of the 
scientific consensus is now seen as an alignment with liberal views consistent with other 
“cultural” issues that divide the country (i.e., abortion, gun control, health care, and evolution). 
This partisan divide on climate change was not the case in the 1990s. It is a recent phenomenon, 
following in the wake of the 1997 Kyoto Treaty that threatened the material interests of powerful 
economic and political interests, particularly members of the fossil-fuel industry.3 The great 
danger of a protracted partisan divide is that the debate will take the form of what I call a “logic 
schism,” a breakdown in debate, in which opposing sides are talk about completely different 
cultural issues.4 
This article seeks to delve into the climate change debate through the lens of the social 
sciences. I take this approach not because the physical sciences have become less relevant, but 
because we need to understand the social and psychological processes by which people receive 
and understand the science of global warming. I explain the cultural dimensions of the climate 
debate as it is presently configured, outline three possible paths by which the debate can 
progress, and describe specific techniques that can drive that debate toward broader consensus. 
This goal is imperative, for without a broader consensus on climate change in the United States, 
 
Americans and citizens around the globe will be unable to formulate effective social, political, 
and economic solutions to the changing circumstances of our planet.  
 
Cultural Processing of Climate Science 
When analyzing complex scientific information, people are “boundedly rational,” to use Herbert 
Simon’s phrase; we are “cognitive misers,” according to Susan Fiske and Shelley Taylor, with 
limited cognitive capacity to fully investigate every issue we face. People everywhere employ 
ideological filters that reflect their identity, worldview, and belief systems. These filters are 
strongly influenced by group values, and we generally endorse the position that most directly 
reinforces the connection we have with others in our referent group—what Dan Kahan refers to 
as “cultural cognition.” In so doing, we cement our connection with our cultural groups and 
strengthen our definition of self. This tendency is driven by an innate desire to maintain a 
consistency in beliefs by giving greater weight to evidence and arguments that support pre-
existing beliefs, and by expending disproportionate energy trying to refute views or arguments 
that are contrary to those beliefs. Instead of investigating a complex issue, we often simply learn 
what our referent group believes and seek to integrate those beliefs with our own views.  
Over time, these ideological filters become increasingly stable and resistant to change 
through multiple reinforcing mechanisms. First, we’ll consider evidence when it is accepted or, 
ideally, presented by a knowledgeable source from our cultural community; and we’ll dismiss 
information that is advocated by sources that represent groups whose values we reject. Second, 
we will selectively choose information sources that support our ideological position. For 
example, frequent viewers of Fox News are more likely to say that the Earth’s temperature has 
not been rising, that any temperature increase is not due to human activities, and that addressing 
climate change would have deleterious effects on the economy.5 One might expect the converse 
to be true of National Public Radio listeners. The result of this cultural processing and group 
cohesion dynamics lead to two overriding conclusions about the climate change debate 
First, climate change IS NOT a “pollution” issue. While the US Supreme Court 
decided in 2007 that greenhouse gases were legally an air pollutant, in a cultural sense, they are 
something far different. The reduction of greenhouse gases is not the same as the reduction of 
sulfur oxides, nitrogen oxides, carbon monoxide, or particulates. These forms of pollution are 
manmade, they are harmful, and they are the unintended waste products of industrial production. 
Ideally, we would like to eliminate their production through the mobilization of economic and 
technical resources. But the chief greenhouse gas, carbon dioxide, is both manmade and natural. 
It is not inherently harmful; it is natural part of the natural systems; and we do not desire to 
eliminate its production. It is not a toxic waste or a strictly technical problem to be solved. 
Rather, it is an endemic part of our society and who we are. To a large degree, it is a highly 
desirable output as it correlates with our standard of living. Greenhouse gas emissions rise with a 
rise in a nation’s wealth, something all people want. To reduce carbon dioxide requires an 
alteration in nearly every facet of the economy, and therefore, nearly every facet of our culture. 
To recognize greenhouse gases as a problem requires us to change a great deal about how we 
view the world and ourselves within it. And that leads to the second distinction. 
Climate change IS an existential challenge to our contemporary worldviews. The 
cultural challenge of climate change is enormous and threefold, each facet leading to the next. 
The first facet is that we have to think of a formerly benign, even beneficial, material in a new 
way—as a relative, not absolute, hazard. Only in an imbalanced concentration does it become 
 
problematic. But to understand and accept this, we need to conceive of the global ecosystem in a 
new way.  
This challenge leads us to the second facet: Not only do we have to change our view of 
the ecosystem, but we also have to change our view of our place within it. Have we as a species 
grown to such numbers, and has our technology grown to such power, that we can alter and 
manage the ecosystem on a planetary scale? This is an enormous cultural question that alters our 
worldviews. As a result, some see the question and subsequent answer as intellectual and 
spiritual hubris, while others see it as self-evident.  
But if we answer this question in the affirmative, the third facet challenges us to consider 
new and perhaps unprecedented forms of global ethics and governance to address it. Climate 
change is the ultimate “commons problem,” as Garrett Hardin defined it, where every individual 
has an incentive to emit greenhouse gases to improve their standard of living, while the costs of 
this activity are borne by all. Unfortunately, the distribution of costs in this global issue is 
asymmetrical with vulnerable populations in poor countries bearing the larger burden. So we 
need to rethink our ethics to keep pace with our technological abilities. Does mowing the lawn or 
driving a fuel inefficient car in Ann Arbor, Mich. have ethical implications for the people in low-
lying areas of Bangladesh? If you accept anthropogenic climate change, then the answer to this 
question is yes, and we must develop global institutions to reflect that recognition. But this is an 
issue of global ethics and governance on a scale that we have never seen, affecting virtually 
every economic activity on the globe and requiring the most complicated and intrusive global 
agreement ever negotiated. 
Taken together, these three facets of our existential challenge illustrate the magnitude of 
the cultural debate that climate change provokes. Climate change challenges us to examine 
previously unexamined beliefs and worldviews. It acts as a flashpoint (albeit a massive one) for 
deeper cultural and ideological conflicts that lie at the root of many of our environmental 
problems, and includes differing conceptions of science, economics, religion, psychology, media, 
development, and governance. It is a proxy for “deeper conflicts over alternative visions of the 
future and competing centers of authority in society,” as Mike Hulme underscores in Why We 
Disagree About Climate Change. And, as such, it provokes a violent debate among cultural 
communities on one side who perceive their values to be threatened by change, and cultural 
communities on the other side who perceive their values to be threatened by the status quo.  
 
Three Ways Forward  
If the public debate over climate change is no longer about greenhouse gases and climate models, 
but about values, worldviews, and ideology, what form will this clash of ideologies take? I see 
three possible forms.   
The Optimistic Form is where people do not have to change their values at all. In other 
words, the easiest way to eliminate the commons problem of climate change is to develop 
technological solutions that do not require major alterations to our values, worldviews, or 
behavior: carbon-free renewable energy, carbon capture and sequestration technologies, geo-
engineering, or others. Some see this as an unrealistic future. Others see it as the only way 
forward since people become attached to their level of prosperity, feel entitled to keep it, and will 
not accept restraints or support government efforts to impose restraints.6 Government-led 
investment in alternative energy sources, therefore, becomes more viable than the enactment of 
regulations and taxes to reduce fossil fuel use. 
The Pessimistic Form is where people will fight to protect their values. This most dire 
 
outcome results in a logic schism, where opposing sides debate different issues, seek only 
information that supports their position and disconfirms the others’, and even go so far as to 
demonize the other. Roger Pielke in The Honest Broker: Making Sense of Science in Policy and 
Politics describes the extreme of such schisms as “abortion politics,” where the two sides are 
debating completely different issues and “no amount of scientific information … can reconcile 
the different values.” Consider, for example, the recent decision by the Heartland Institute to post 
a billboard in Chicago comparing those who believe in climate change with the Unabomber. In 
reply, climate activist groups posted billboards attacking Heartland and its financial supporters. 
This attack-counter attack strategy is symptomatic of a broken public discourse over climate 
change.   
The Consensus-based Form involves a reasoned societal debate, focused on the full scope 
of technical and social dimensions of the problem and the feasibility and desirability of multiple 
solutions. It is this form to which scientists have the most to offer, playing the role of what Peilke 
calls the “honest broker”—a person who can “integrate scientific knowledge with stakeholder 
concerns to explore alternative possible courses of action.” In this form of social debate, 
resolution is found through a focus on its underlying elements, moving away from positions 
(e.g., climate change is or is not happening), and toward the underlying interests and values at 
play. How do we get there? Research in negotiation and dispute resolution can offer techniques 
for moving forward.  
 
Techniques for a Consensus-based Discussion  
In seeking a social consensus on climate change, discussion must move beyond a strict focus on 
the technical aspects of the science to include its cultural underpinnings. Below are eight 
techniques for exploring the ideological filters that people use in the social debate.   
 1. Know your audience. Any message on climate change must be framed in a way that 
fits with the cultural norms of the target audience. The 2011 study Climate Change in the 
American Mind offers a segmentation of the American public into six groups when it comes to 
views on climate change science (see sidebar on page TK).  On the two extremes are the climate 
change “believers” and “disbelievers.” Consensus-based discussion is not open to these groups, 
as they are already employing logic schism tactics that are closed to debate or engagement. The 
polarity of these groups is well known: on the one side, climate change is a hoax, humans have 
no impact on the climate, and nothing is happening; on the other side, climate change is an 
imminent crisis that will devastate the Earth and human activity explains all climate changes.  
The challenge is to move the debate away from the loud minorities at the extremes and to 
engage the majority in the middle—the “convinced,” the “skeptical,” and the “disengaged.” 
People in these groups are more open to consensus-based debate, and through direct engagement 
can be separated from the ideological extremes of their cultural community. 
2. Ask the right scientific questions. For a consensus-based discussion, climate change 
science should be presented not as a binary yes or no question,7 but as a series of six questions. 
Some are scientific in nature, with associated levels of uncertainty and probability; others are 
matters of scientific judgment.  
1. Are greenhouse gas concentrations increasing in the atmosphere? Yes. This is a 
scientific question, based on rigorous data and measurements of atmospheric 
chemistry and science. In fact, as William Nordhaus wrote in the New York Times 
inMarch 2012, “The finding that global temperatures are rising over the last century-
plus is one of the most robust findings in climate science and statistics.” 
Commented [HA1]: It was March 22 if you want the exact 
date 
 
2. Does this increase lead to a general warming of the planet? Yes. This is also a 
scientific question; the chemical mechanics of the greenhouse effect and “negative 
radiative forcing” are well established. 
3. Has climate changed over the past century? Yes. Global temperature increases have 
been rigorously measured through multiple techniques and strongly supported by 
multiple scientific analyses. 
4. Are humans partially responsible for this increase? The answer to this question is a 
matter of scientific judgment. Increases in global mean temperatures have a very 
strong correlation with increases in man-made greenhouse gases since the industrial 
revolution. While science cannot confirm causation, fingerprint analysis of multiple 
possible causes has been examined, and the only plausible explanation is that of 
human-induced temperature changes. Until a plausible alternative hypothesis is 
presented, this explanation prevails for the scientific community. 
5. Will the climate continue to change over the next century? Again, this question is a 
matter of scientific judgment. But given the answers to the previous four questions, it 
is reasonable to believe that continued increases in greenhouse gases will lead to 
continued changes in the climate. 
6. What will be the environmental and social impact of such change? This is the 
scientific question with the greatest uncertainty. The answer comprises a bell curve of 
possible outcomes and varying associated probabilities, from low to extreme impact. 
Uncertainty in this variation is due to limited current data on the Earth’s climate 
system, imperfect modeling of these physical processes, and the unpredictability of 
human actions that can both exasperate or moderate the climate shifts. These 
uncertainties make predictions difficult and are an area upon which much debate can 
take place. And yet, the physical impacts of climate change are already becoming 
visible in ways that are consistent with scientific modeling, particularly in Greenland, 
the Arctic, the Antarctic, and low-lying islands.   
In asking each of these questions, a central consideration is whether people recognize the 
level of scientific consensus associated with each one. In fact, studies have shown that people’s 
support for climate policies and action are linked to their perceptions about scientific agreement 
on the issue. But the reality is that the belief that “most scientists think global warming is 
happening” declined from 47 percent to 39 percent among Americans between 2008 and 2011.8  
3. Move beyond data and models. Climate skepticism is not a knowledge deficit issue. 
Aaron McCright and Riley Dunlap have observed that increased education and self-reported 
understanding of climate science has been shown to correlate with lower concern among 
conservatives and Republicans and greater concern among liberals and Democrats. Research also 
has found that once people have made up their minds on the science of the climate issue, 
providing continued scientific evidence actually makes them more resolute in resisting 
conclusions that are at variance with their cultural beliefs.9 One needs to recognize that reasoning 
is suffused with emotion and people often use reasoning to reach a predetermined end that fits 
their cultural worldviews. When people hear about climate change, they may, for example, hear 
an implicit criticism that their lifestyle is the cause of the issue or that they are morally deficient 
for not recognizing it. But emotion can be a useful ally; it can create the abiding commitments 
needed to sustain action on the difficult issue of climate change. To do this, people must be 
convinced that something can be done to address it; that the challenge is not too great nor are its 
impacts preordained. The key to engaging people in a consensus-driven debate about climate 
 
change is to confront the emotionality of the issue and then address the deeper ideological values 
that may be threatened to create this emotionality. 
4. Focus on broker frames. People interpret information by fitting it to pre-existing 
narratives or issue categories that mesh with their worldview. Thus information must be 
presented in a form that fits with those templates, using carefully researched metaphors, 
allusions, and examples that trigger a new way of thinking about the personal relevance of 
climate change. To be effective communicators, climate communicators must use the language 
of the cultural community they are engaging. When addressing a business audience, for example, 
one must use business terminology, such as net present value, return on investment, increased 
consumer demand, rising raw material costs, etc.   
More generally, one can seek possible broker frames that move away from a pessimistic 
appeal to fear and instead focus on optimistic appeals that trigger the emotionality of a desired 
future. In addressing climate change, we are asking who we strive to be as a people, and what 
kind of world we want to leave our children. To gain buy-in, one can stress American know-how 
and our capacity to innovate, focusing on activities already underway by cities, citizens, and 
businesses.10  
This approach frames climate change mitigation as a gain rather than a loss to specific 
cultural groups. Research has shown that climate skepticism can be caused by a motivational 
tendency to defend the status quo based on the prior assumption that any change will be painful. 
But by encouraging people to regard pro-environmental change as patriotic and consistent with 
protecting the status quo, it can be framed as a continuation rather than a departure from the past. 
Specific broker frames can be used that engage the interests of both sides of the debate. 
For example, when Energy Secretary Steven Chu referred in November 2010 to advances in 
renewable energy technology in China as the United States’ “Sputnik moment,” he was framing 
climate change as a common threat to US scientific and economic competitiveness. When Pope 
Benedict XVI linked the threat of climate change with threats to life and dignity on New Year’s 
Day 2010, he was painting it as an issue of religious morality. When CNA’s Military Advisory 
Board, a group of elite retired US military officers, called climate change a “threat multiplier” in 
its 2006 report, it was using a national security frame. When the Lancet Commission pronounced 
climate change as the biggest global health threat of the 21st century in a 2009 article, the 
organization was using a quality of life frame. And when the Center of American Progress, a 
Washington, D.C. think tank aligned with the Democratic Party, connected climate change to the 
conservation ideals of Presidents Theodore Roosevelt and Richard Nixon, they were framing the 
issue as consistent with Republican ideals. 
One broker frame that deserves particular attention is the need to replace the uncertainty 
or probability of climate change with the risk of climate change.11 People understand low 
probability, high consequence events and the need to address them. For example, they buy fire 
insurance for their homes even though the probability of a fire is low, because they understand 
that the financial consequence is too great. In the same way, climate change for some may be 
perceived as a low risk, high consequence event, so the prudent course of action is to obtain 
insurance in the form of both behavioral and technological change. 
5. Recognize the power of language and terminology. Words have multiple meanings 
in different communities, and terms can trigger unintended reactions in a target audience. For 
example, one study has shown that Republicans were less likely to endorse that the phenomenon 
is real when it is referred to as “global warming” (44 percent) rather than “climate change” (60 
percent), while Democrats were unaffected by the term (87 percent vs. 86 percent). So language 
 
matters: the partisan divide dropped from 43 percent under a “global warming” frame to 26 
percent under a “climate change” frame.12  
Other terms with multiple meanings include: “climate denier,” which some use to refer to 
those who are not open to discussion on the issue, and others see as a thinly veiled and highly 
insulting reference to “Holocaust denier”; “uncertainty” is a scientific concept to convey 
variance or deviation from a specific value, but is interpreted by a lay audience to mean that 
scientists do not know the answer; “consensus” is the process by which the IPCC forms its 
position, but leads some in the public to believe that climate science is a matter of “opinion” 
rather than data and modeling.  
Overall, the challenge becomes one of framing complex scientific issues in a language 
that a lay and highly politicized audience can hear. This becomes increasingly challenging when 
addressing some inherently non-intuitive and complex aspects of climate modeling that are hard 
to explain, such as the importance of feedback loops, time delays, accumulations, and 
nonlinearities in dynamic systems.13 Unless scientists can accurately convey the nature of 
climate modeling, others in the social debate will alter their claims to satisfy their political 
interests.  
6. Employ climate brokers. People are more likely to feel open to consider evidence 
when a recognized member of their cultural community presents it.14 Certainly, statements by 
former Vice President Al Gore and Senator James Inhofe evoke visceral responses from 
individuals on either side of the partisan divide. But individuals with credibility on both sides of 
the debate can act as what I call climate brokers. Since a majority of Republicans do not believe 
the science of climate change, compared to a majority of Democrats who do, the most effective 
broker would come from the political right. Climate brokers can include representatives from 
business, the religious community, the entertainment industry, the military, talk show hosts, and 
politicians that can frame climate change in language that will engage the audience to whom they 
most directly connect. When people hear about the need to address climate change from their 
church, synagogue, mosque, or temple, for example, they will connect the issue to their moral 
values. When they hear it from their business leaders and investment managers, they will connect 
it to their economic interests. And when they hear it from their military leaders, they will connect 
it to their interests for a safe and secure nation. 
7. Recognize multiple referent groups. The presentation of information can be designed 
in a fashion that recognizes that individuals are members of multiple referent groups. The 
underlying frames employed in one cultural community may be at variance with the values 
dominant within the communities engaged in climate change debate. For example, while some 
may reject the science of climate change by perceiving the scientific review process to be corrupt 
as part of one cultural community, they also may recognize the legitimacy of the scientific 
process as members of other cultural communities (such as users of the modern health care 
system). While someone may see the costs of fossil fuel reductions as too great and potentially 
damaging to the economy as members of one community, they also may see the value in 
reducing dependence on foreign oil as members of another community who value strong national 
defense. This frame incongruence emerged in the 2011 US Republican primary as candidate Jon 
Huntsman warned that Republicans risk becoming the “anti-science party,” if they continue to 
reject the science on climate change. What Huntsman alluded to is that most Americans actually 
do trust the scientific process, even if they don’t fully understand it.   
8.  Employ events as leverage for change. Studies have found that most Americans 
believe that climate change will affect geographically and temporally distant people and places. 
 
But studies also have shown that people are more likely to believe in the science when they have 
a vivid experience with extreme weather phenomena. This has lead climate communicators to 
link climate change to major events, such as Hurricane Katrina in 2005 and Hurricane Ike in 
2008, or to more recent floods in the American Midwest and Asia, as well as to droughts in 
Texas and Africa, to hurricanes along the East Coast and Gulf of Mexico, and to snow storms in 
Western states and New England. The cumulative body of weather evidence, reported by media 
outlets and linked to climate change, will increase the number of people who are concerned 
about the issue, see it as less uncertain, and feel more confident that we must take actions to 
mitigate its effects. For example, in explaining the recent increase in belief in climate change 
among Americans, the 2012 National Survey of American Public Opinion on Climate Change 
noted, “about half of Americans now point to observations of temperature changes and weather 
as the main reasons they believe global warming is taking place.”15 
 
Ending the Climate Science Wars 
Will we see a social consensus on climate change? If beliefs about the existence of global 
warming are becoming more ideologically entrenched and gaps between conservatives and 
liberals are widening, the solution space for resolving the issue will collapse and the debate will 
be based on power and coercion. In such a scenario, domination by the science-based forces in 
the policy arena looks less likely than domination by the forces of skepticism, since the former 
has to “prove” its case while the latter merely needs to cast doubt. But such a polarized outcome 
is not a predetermined outcome. And if it were to form, it can be reversed.  
Is there a reason to be hopeful? When looking for reasons to be hopeful about a social 
consensus on climate change, I look to public opinion changes around cigarette smoking and 
cancer. For years, the scientific community recognized that the preponderance of 
epidemiological and mechanistic data pointed to a link between the habit and the disease. And 
for years, the public rejected that conclusion. But through a process of political, economic, 
social, and legal debate over values and beliefs, a social consensus emerged. The general public 
now accepts that cigarettes cause cancer and governments have set policy to address this fact. 
Interestingly, two powerful forces that many see as obstacles to a comparable social consensus 
on climate change were overcome in the cigarette debate.  
The first obstacle is the powerful lobby of industrial forces that can resist a social and 
political consensus. In the case of the cigarette debate, powerful economic interests mounted a 
campaign to obfuscate the scientific evidence and to block a social and political consensus.   
Tobacco companies created their own pro-tobacco science, but eventually the public health 
community overcame pro-tobacco scientists.  
The second obstacle to convincing a skeptical public is the lack of a definitive statement 
by the scientific community about the future implications of climate change. The 2007 IPCC 
report states, “Human activities…are modifying the concentration of atmospheric 
constituents…that absorb or scatter radiant energy…[M]ost of the observed warming over the 
last 50 years is very likely to have been due to the increase in greenhouse gas emissions.” Some 
point to the conditioned word “likely” to argue that scientists still don’t know and action in 
unwarranted. But science is not designed to provide a definitive smoking gun. In fact, it is 
important to remember that the landmark 1964 Surgeon General’s report about the dangers of 
smoking was equally conditional. And even today, we cannot state with scientific certainty that 
smoking causes lung cancer. Like the global climate, the human body is too complex a system 
for absolute certainty. We can explain epidemiologically why a person could get cancer from 
 
cigarette smoking and statistically how that person will likely get cancer, but, as the 1964 
Surgeon General reports explains, “statistical methods cannot establish proof of a causal 
relationship in an association [between cigarette smoking and lung cancer]. The causal 
significance of an association is a matter of judgment, which goes beyond any statement of 
statistical probability.” Yet the general public now accepts this causal linkage, and the growing 
number of smoking bans is predicated on a prudent assessment of the scientific evidence, not on 
scientifically proved causality.  
What will get us there? While climate brokers are needed from all areas of society—
business, religion, military, politics, etc.—I would like to direct attention to one field in 
particular that needs to become more engaged: the academic scientist and particularly the social 
scientist. Too much of the debate is dominated by the physical sciences in defining the problem 
and by economics in defining the solutions. Both fields focus heavily on the rational and 
quantitative treatments of the issue and fail to capture the behavioral and cultural aspects that 
explain why people accept or reject scientific evidence, analysis, and conclusions. But science is 
never socially or politically inert, and scientists have a duty to recognize its effect on society and 
to communicate that effect to those who must live with the consequences. Social scientists can 
help in this endeavor.  
But the relative absence of the social sciences in the climate debate is driven by specific 
structural and institutional controls that channel research work away from empirical relevance. 
Social scientists limit involvement in such “outside” activities, because the underlying norms of 
what is considered legitimate and valuable research as well as the overt incentives and reward 
structures within the academy lead away from such endeavors. Tenure and promotion is based 
primarily on the publication of top-tier academic journal articles. This is the signal of merit and 
success. Any effort on any other endeavor is decidedly discouraged.  
The role of the “public intellectual” has become an arcane and elusive option in today’s 
social sciences. Moreover, it is a difficult role to play. The academic rules are not clear and the 
public backlash can be uncomfortable; many of my colleagues and I are regular recipients of 
hostile email messages and web-based attacks. But the lack of academic scientists in the public 
debate harms society by leaving out critical voices for informing and resolving the climate 
debate. There are signs, however, that this model of scholarly isolation is changing. Some leaders 
within the field have begun to call for more engagement within the public arena as a way to 
invigorate the discipline and underscore its investment in the defense of civil society. As 
members of society, all scientists have a responsibility to bring their expertise to the decision-
making process. It is time for social scientists to accept this responsibility. 
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 “Six Americas” and Their Views on Climate Change  
 
The Alarmed (2009: 18%, 2011: 12%) are most convinced that climate change is happening, see 
it is a threat to them personally, and are very worried about it. This group tends to be moderate to 
liberal Democrats who are active in their communities. They are more likely to be women, older 
middle-aged (55-64 years old), college educated and upper income, and hold relatively strong 
 
egalitarian values, favoring government intervention to assure the basic needs of all people.  
They believe that it is more important to protect the environment than privilege economic 
growth, and are least likely to be evangelical Christians among the six groups. 
 
The Concerned (2009: 33%, 2011: 27%) are also convinced that climate change is happening, 
although they are less certain and see it less as a personal threat than the alarmed. This group is 
very representative of the full diversity of the United States in terms of gender, age, income, 
education, and ethnicity—and tends to comprise moderate Democrats with an average rate of 
involvement in civic activities.   
 
The Cautious (2009: 19%, 2011: 25%) are somewhat convinced that climate change is 
happening, but the belief is relatively weak, and many say that they could change their minds. 
This group is evenly divided between moderate Democrats and Republicans, with relative low 
levels of civic engagement and traditional religious beliefs.   
 
The Disengaged (2009: 12%, 2011: 10%) are not at all sure that climate change is happening 
and are the group most likely to say they could easily change their minds. They have hardly 
thought about climate change and do not consider it personally important. This group tends to be 
moderate Democrat but is politically inactive. They prefer economic growth over environmental 
protection and are more likely to be minority women with less education and lower incomes. 
 
The Doubtful (2009: 11%, 2011: 15%) say that they don’t know whether climate change is 
happening or not and do not see it as a personal threat. This group is more likely to be male, 
older, better educated, high income, white, and Republican, with an average rate of involvement 
in civic activities. They hold strongly individualistic values and are more likely to say that they 
are “born again.” 
 
The Dismissive (2009: 7%, 2011: 10%) are sure that climate change is not happening and are 
they are not worried about the issue at all because they think it doesn’t exist. This group is more 
likely to be high-income, well-educated, white men. They are also more likely to be very 
conservative Republicans who are civically active, hold strong religious beliefs, and are the 
segment most likely to be evangelical Christian. They strongly endorse individualistic values and 
oppose most forms of government intervention. 
 
Source: Anthony Leiserowitz et al, “Global Warming’s Six Americas,” Yale Project on Climate 
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Source: Aaron McCright and Riley Dunlap, “The Politicization of Climate Change and 
Polarization in the American Public’s Views of Global Warming, 2001-2010,” The Sociological 
Quarterly, 52, 2011. 
 
The charts show the percentage of Americans who believe that global warming has already 
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